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Firms may face nancing constraints as a result of rational behaviour of poten-
tial lenders due to asymmetric information. In this article, a theoretical model
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impact of 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rm level. A unique rm
panel data set for German manufacturing is used to assess the empirical evi-
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1 Introduction
The assessment of causes and eects of nancing constraints at the rm level
has been on the research agenda during the last decade.
1
In the light of banking
crisis developing in some south-east Asian countries and Russia, the impact on
real rm behaviour gained additional interest. While there exists a large and
still growing literature both on the theoretical and empirical aspects of nancing
constraints for investment decisions, the potential link to employment eects
was not in the center of interest. In particular, empirical tests are rare.
Among the contributions to the analysis of the short-run impact of nanc-
ing constraints on employment Nickell and Wadhwani (1991) are among the
rst. Controlling for other determinants of labour demand they nd, as well
as Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), positive employment eects of market value
and negative eects of leverage using UK rm data.
2
Sharpe (1994) uses US
manufacturing sector rm data and nds that more highly leveraged rms re-
duce labour hoarding. As in most empirical studies on nancing constraints
small rms are found to exhibit stronger reactions than large rms. Two recent
papers by Funke, Maurer, Siddiqui and Strulik (1998), and Winker (1999a) use
German rm level data and nd similar eects.
This paper aims at enlarging the body of knowledge on the nancing con-
straints { employment nexus based on an explicit model of employment adjust-
ment and a unique rm panel data set. While institutional aspects played a
more prominent role in explaining nancing constraints in the literature vintage
of the fties and sixties, the main ingredient of current approaches towards mod-
eling incomplete nancial markets is asymmetric information (see Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981)). If rms have better information on project outcomes ex ante
and/or ex post, problems of adverse selection, adverse incentives and costly
state verication come up in external nance. Consequently, a cost gap be-
tween internal and external nance arises or more binding constraints in form
of quantity restrictions (\credit rationing").
Taking nancing constraints as given, rms react by cutting down invest-
ment and innovation expenditures, changing prices on non competitive markets
or adjusting employment. Decisions on investment and, in particular, innova-
tions are long run by nature. Consequently, the interdependence with nancing
constraints has to be taken into account explicitly.
In this paper, we concentrate on the impact of nancing constraints on
employment via short-run liquidity constraints. Hence, nancing constraints
can be assumed to be predetermined as well as the impact of long-run decisions
on innovations and investment. Firms adjust employment under uncertainty
about demand within a framework of monopolistic competition on the product
market. The theoretical model yields testable hypotheses about the direction
and the frequency of employment and price changes depending on capacity
1
See Hubbard (1998) for a recent overview.
2
Thereby, it is assumed that these nancial variables are exogenous to the employment
decision.
1
constraints, the autocorrelation and the volatility of demand shocks, the degree
of competition on the market, and the existence of nancing constraints. An
endogenous adjustment of the working time is taken into account.
The empirical assessment of these hypotheses is based on a unique panel
of micro data from West German manufacturing rms. The data set contains
qualitative quarterly information about the employment adjustment and ad-
justments of the working time for 2405 rms during the period 1980{1992. In
addition, it contains quarterly data on capacity constraints and annual data
on rm size, demand expectations and the innovation behaviour of the rms.
Finally, it includes explicit statements on nancing constraints. The time-series
dimension of the data permits the detailed investigation of the adjustment pro-
cess, and the high frequency of the data permits the analysis of the volatility
of the employment adjustment depending on the rms' nancial status.
In section 2 the theoretical framework for the determinants of nancing con-
straints and the employment adjustment is introduced. Subsection 3.1 provides
a description of the data set and the empirical specication, while subsection 3.2
presents the estimation results for the determinants of nancing constraints as
well as the impact of nancing constraints on employment and price adjust-
ments. Section 4 summarizes the main ndings.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Determinants of nancing constraints
The notion nancing constraints covers a broad range of capital market frictions
both at the macro and the micro level.
3
In this paper, the impact of nancing
constraints on the employment adjustment at the rm level is at the center
of interest. Hence, general conditions on nancial markets are assumed to be
exogeneously determined. At the rm level, nancing constraints describe a
situation where the demand for funds of a rm is not satised at the current
market rate, taking all observable project characteristics into account. In par-
ticular, a rm which pays a high risk premium on its loan due to observable
high risk of its projects will not be considered as nancially constrained.
The interaction between rms and investors can result in nancing con-
straints due to asymmetric information. Common themes of this approach are
adverse selection and adverse incentive eects. It seems plausible to assume
that entrepreneurs have better information about the riskiness of their projects
than outside lenders or investors. Then, contractual rates of returns will in-
uence the quality of nanced projects,
4
leading to a gap between the costs
of internal and external funds. If supply of credits by banks is limited, credit
rationing might occur as described by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), i.e. given ex-
cess demand prot maximizing banks will not raise interest rates to clear the
market. The reason is that a raise of the interest changes the quality mix of
3
See Hubbard (1998), p. 194.
4
See Winker (1999a), section 2, for a more formal exposition.
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Figure 1: Supply of and demand for funds
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the loan demand, since low variance projects become rst unprotable. Sim-
ilar eects occur due to incentive problems, i.e. entrepreneurs may react to a
raise of the interest rate by choosing more risky projects; eventually the banks'
expected returns decrease. Finally, costly monitoring of project outcomes and
consideration of moral hazard problems have a similar impact on costs of and
access to external nancing.
5
An upshot of some of the eects of asymmetric information for the micro
relationship between rms and investor is given by gure 1 which displays de-
mand and supply of funds for a single rm.
6
Table 1 summarizes the basic
ndings on the impact of variables related to information at the rm and bank
level on credit demand, supply and the risk of facing nancing constraints which
are discussed in the sequel.
The demand for funds (denoted by D in gure 1) is determined by invest-
ment and production opportunities of the rm. Ceteris paribus, it exhibits the
usual negative slope with regard to the costs of funds r. Under the complete-
market assumption, the intersection of this demand function with the perfectly
elastic supply of of funds S
0
at the market rate of return r

would determine
the volume of funds invested K

.
7
The demand for external funds results by
subtracting available internal funds W
0
or W
1
, respectively.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full characterisation of the
5
See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) for a recent overview.
6
A similar illustration and more extensive discussion can be found in Hubbard (1998), p. 196.
7
Here, the term investment covers all kind of expenditures for the purpose of generating
returns, i.e. physical investment, employment or R&D expenditures.
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Table 1: Sources of nancing constraints
uncer- business rms' banks' rm
tainty conditions expectations expectations size
 bc
+
bc
 
be
+
be
 
be
+
be
 
credit demand (cd) + { + + ? {
credit supply (cs) { + { + { +
prob(cs < cd) + { + + ? { + {
demand for dierent sources of external funds. However, the impact of some
variables related to information problems can be analyzed within this general
framework. First, an overall increase in uncertainty about project outcomes
() shifts the demand for credit curve upwards since part of the risk is shifted
to borrowers due to limited liability. Good current business conditions (bc
+
)
increase internal funds through increased cash ow and, consequently, reduce
the needs for external funds, while bad current business conditions (bc
 
) have
the opposite eect. Firms' expectations on future business conditions show a
dierent impact. While positive prospects (be
+
) increase the demand for funds
in order to nance innovations, capacity and production increases,
8
the impact
of negative prospects (be
 
) is not unequivocal. Reduced output requires less
nancing of input factors on the one hand. On the other hand, as long as
negative prospects are private information, rms may compensate expected
reduced liquidity and possible nancing constraints of future periods at least
partially by increased external nance today. Finally, rm size tends to reduce
the needs for external funds since the growth rate of large rms is smaller, and
they are more likely to be able to nance protable projects with internally
generated funds.
9
The supply of funds to rms can also be analyzed using gure 1. It is
assumed that the opportunity costs of internal funds, W
0
or W
1
respectively,
are equal to the market equilibrium rate r

. If additional external funds are
required, the cost gap mentioned above leads to a positively sloped supply curve
as S
1
. If the eects of asymmetric information become more pronounced supply
curves like S
2
may result. Here, a nancing hierarchy is modeled. Up to W
0
projects are funded from internal sources. Then, the rm may have access
to a limited amount of bank loans at rates increasing with the loan volume
K  W
0
. This results in the rst positively sloped part of S
2
. After having
exhausted bank loans, the rm may try to raise additional funds by issuing
equity. The step of the supply curve indicates the xed costs related to an
IPO. Since equity nance is subject to the same kind of adverse selection and
moral hazard problems as loan supply,
10
the slope of the supply of funds curve
8
A formal analysis of this eect can be found in Winker (1999a).
9
See Egeln, Licht and Steil (1997).
10
See Myers and Majluf (1994).
4
remains positive. Eventually it may become vertical, when a larger contractual
rate of return does not imply higher expected returns to the investor any more
due to bankruptcy risk and costs. Such a case corresponds to the strong version
of credit rationing.
The analysis of the impact of observable variables on the supply of external
funds does not dier substantially between these cases, i.e. a positively sloped
supply curve, a nancing hierarchy situation and credit rationing in the strong
sense. First, an overall increase of market uncertainty () increases the eects
of asymmetric information. Hence, the positively sloped part of the supply
curves are shifted upwards and to the left. Positive business conditions (bc
+
)
at the rm level correspond to increased internal funds and, consequently, shift
the supply curve to the right, while the contrary eect results from negative
business conditions (bc
 
). Furthermore, investors may observe current business
conditions and use them as proxy for rm risk. Then, an additional positive
eect on the supply of external funds results. Firms' expectations (be
+
,be
 
)
do not inuence the supply curve, since they have no impact on currently
available internal funds, nor can they be observed by outside lenders. However,
expectations may be observable at a sectoral level. As they correlate with
repayment probabilities, positive expectations for the sector (be
+
) will shift the
supply curve to the right and vice versa for negative expectations (be
 
). Finally,
large and old rms are to a lesser extent subject to asymmetric information and,
therefore, face a atter supply curve.
11
Summing up the determinants of supply of and demand for external funds,
some hypothesis on the variables determining the probability of facing nancing
constraints, i.e. prob(cs < cd), can be derived (see table 1): Positive business
conditions at the rm level and positive banks' expectations based on the sec-
toral development reduce uncertainty and, consequently, also the probability
that nancing constraints become binding. The same holds true for large rms.
On the other side, positive rms' expectations, which are private knowledge,
increase the risk of facing nancing constraints. Firms are assumed to observe
and react to nancing constraints, if either they are in a situation as depicted
for S
2
in gure 1, i.e. they cannot obtain additional funds even at (marginally)
higher interest rates, or if the available nance (intersection of D and S
1
) diers
markedly from optimal nance in a complete-market framework (intersection
of D and S
0
).
2.2 Employment adjustment
The employment adjustment is analyzed within a framework of monopolistic
competition of the product market.
12
Uncertainty is introduced into the model
through the assumption that employment and prices adjust only with a delay
11
See Egeln, Licht and Steil (1997), and Winker (1999a).
12
See Barro (1972), Dixit, Stiglitz (1977) and Blanchard, Kiyotaki (1987).
5
with respect to demand and cost changes.
13
The analysis of the dynamic ad-
justment in terms of adjustment delays and uncertainty reduces the dynamic
decision problem of the rm to a sequence of static decision models which can
be solved stepwise:
{ Output is determined in the short run with predetermined employment,
prices and capacities.
{ The employment adjustment and the price setting take place in the medium
run and thus under uncertainty about the location of the demand curve.
{ Investment and innovation behaviour are determined in the long run, i.e.
capacities and the production technology are treated as predetermined
for the price and employment decision.
Financing constraints aect employment and prices rstly via the investment
and innovation decision
14
and secondly directly via the nancing of the wage
bill. The demand for the rm's product is characterized by a rm-specic
demand curve. In order to distinguish demand shifts, the price elasticity of
demand, and demand uncertainty, a log-linear relation is assumed,
lnYD =   ln p+ lnZ + "; E(") = 0;Var(") = 
2
: (1)
Time and rm indices are omitted to simplify the notation. Demand YD de-
pends negatively on the price p with constant elasticity  <  1, Z is a prede-
termined demand shift, and the demand shock " introduces uncertainty: The
realized value of the demand shock is not known at the time of the price and
employment decision. Supply YS is determined by a short-run limitational
production function with capital K and labour L as inputs,
YS = min(YC; YL) = min(
k
K;
l
 L): (2)
YC are capacities, YL is the employment constraint, and 
l
, 
k
are the pro-
ductivities of labour and capital. In the short run, output Y is determined
as the minimum of demand and supply, Y = min(YD; YS). The medium-run
optimization problem of the rm is
max
!L;p
p  E(Y )  w  L  c K (3)
subject to eqs. (1) and (2), and subject to the availability of sucient liquidity.
E is the expectation operator, w are wage costs and c are the user costs of capital
which are treated as exogenous at the rm level. For the optimal solution, three
13
A delayed adjustment is discussed in Kydland, Prescott (1982). Adjustment dynamics of
employment are discussed by Blanchard, Diamond (1992) and Hamermesh, Pfann (1996).
A more detailed discussion of the theoretical structure of the model here is contained in
Smolny (1998a).
14
This part of the employment-nancing nexus is not treated explicitly in this paper. For a
discussion, see Winker (1999b).
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cases can be distinguished:
1. In case of binding capacity constraints, employment is determined from
capacities. No more workers will be hired than can be employed with the
predetermined capital stock. Supply, employment, and the price result from
YS = YL = YC; L(YC) = YC=
l
; (4)
ln p(YC) =
h
lnYC   lnZ   "(; )
i
=: (5)
Employment is given by the maximal number of working places L(YC). The
optimal price depends with elasticity  on capacities YC and expected demand
shifts Z. " := lnYS     ln p  lnZ is the borderline case of the demand shock
which distinguishes the demand constrained regime from the supply constrained
regime. The optimal " and therefore the regime probabilities are completely
determined by the price elasticity of demand  and demand uncertainty .
15
In the capacity constrained regime, the adjustment of employment is inhibited,
and the whole adjustment with respect to expected demand shifts falls on the
price.
2. In case of sucient capacities and liquidity, optimal employment and prices
can be determined from the rst order condition of eq. (3) with respect to
employment,
p(w)  prob(YL < YD)  
l
  w = 0: (6)
The marginal costs of employment are equal to the wage rate w. Marginal
returns are determined as the price, multiplied with the productivity of labour,
and multiplied with the probability that the additional output can be sold, i.e.
if demand exceeds supply. The optimal price is determined by unit labour costs
w=
l
, the mark-up is equal to the optimal probability of the supply constrained
regime on the goods market. Optimal supply and employment result from
inserting this price into the denition of " and solving for YL and L,
YL(w) =   ln p(w) + lnZ + "(; ); L(w) = YL(w)=
l
: (7)
In case of sucient capacities, the price is independent from expected demand
shifts, the rm adjusts quantities.
3. Financing constraints can be treated analogously either to capacity con-
straints or to higher wage costs:
If the rm cannot obtain sucient funds to nance the wage bill, em-
ployment will be lower and the optimal price will be higher, as in case of
capacity constraints.
A gap between the costs of internal and external nance increases marginal
production costs, increases the optimal price, and reduces employment,
as in case of higher wage costs.
15
The regime probabilities are dened as prob(YD < YS) =
R
"
 1
f
"
d". f
"
is the probability
distribution function of the demand shock ".
7
Figure 2: Optimal employment and prices
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2
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
l
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p
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1
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Finally, if nancing constraints hinder innovations and investment, ca-
pacities will be lower, demand will be lower, and marginal costs will be
higher.
The model extends the standard formulation of monopolistic competition by
introducing uncertainty about demand and medium-run capacity and nancing
constraints.
{ Ex ante, the rm sets prices and adjusts employment under uncertainty
about the location of the demand curve, i.e. the rm chooses one point
in the fp; Y g-diagram (see gure 2). Relevant for the employment ad-
justment is a capacity limit YS = YL  YC, the availability of sucient
funds and a minimum price p(w).
{ Ex post, underutilization of employment and capacities or rationing of
demand can occur. The short-run demand situation can be identied from
the utilization of employment, the medium-run business-cycle situation
can be identied from the utilization of capacities.
The model provides a useful framework for the analysis of the employment
and price adjustment during the business cycle. Suppose the stochastic process
generating the demand shocks is autocorrelated. Then, an unexpected demand
shock aects the utilization of labour and capital today. The adjustment of the
rm depends on the availability of capacities: In case of capacity constraints (in
boom periods), employment should remain unchanged, the rm should adjust
the price; with sucient capacities (in recession periods), the rm should adjust
8
Table 2: Employment and price adjustment
utilization innovation nancing
U Z jj  
l
constraints
L + + +   ? ?  
p + +   +   ? +

L
    + ? +

p
+ + +   +
employment and the price should remain unchanged. That means, the model
provides clear testable hypotheses about the eects of capacity utilization U
on the direction L;p and the frequency 
L
; 
p
of employment and price
adjustments with respect to demand shocks (see table 2). The model can be
understood as an error correction model for employment and prices: If the
actual utilization diers from the optimum, employment and/or prices adjust.
Expected increases of demand Z either increase employment or increase
prices, depending on the availability of capacities and nancial funds. Uncer-
tainty increases the variance of output and should increase the necessity of
employment and price adjustments. This results in higher average costs, higher
prices, and less employment. A low price elasticity of demand jj increases the
optimal price and reduces employment. In addition, less competition should
favour employment adjustments against price adjustments in case of demand
shocks.
16
The eects of innovations on the price and employment adjustment are
ambiguous.
17
Process innovations reduce marginal costs which should reduce
prices, but the employment eect is ambiguous due to substitution eects.
Product innovations increase demand Z but tend to reduce competition jj.
Higher demand increases employment and prices, but less competition reduces
employment and increases prices.
Financing constraints aect employment rstly via the nancing of innova-
tions and investment.
18
Second, nancing constraints exhibit a direct eect on
employment via the nancing of the wage bill. Employment increases require
additional liquidity, employment reductions economize on liquidity. Therefore,
a lower level of employment is expected for rms with nancial distress. A neg-
ative eect on employment arises also, if the gap between the costs of internal
and external nance becomes larger.
In addition, it is expected that nancing constraints increase the volatil-
ity of employment. Smoothing employment during the business cycle requires
sucent liquidity, and nancing constraints force rms to economize on wage
costs. For rms with nancial distress, short-run liquidity is more important
16
For a discussion, see Barro (1972), Blanchard, Kiyotaki (1987) and Carlton (1989).
17
For a discussion, see Kamien, Schwarz (1982), Cohen, Levin (1989) and Smolny (1998b).
18
See Winker (1999b).
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than long-run prot maximization.
19
In addition, in case of incoming orders,
the rm might convince the bank that more employment is required. In case
of less orders, it is more dicult for the rm to convince the bank that labour
hoarding of qualied employees increases prots in the long run.
Financing constraints also aect the price setting. A lower level of em-
ployment increases the probability of supply constraints due to an insucient
employment level. Financing constraints exhibit the same eect as capacity
constraints: In case of demand shocks, the employment adjustment is impeded,
and prices rise instead. A price increase is also expected, if nancing constraints
increase marginal costs through higher interest rates. Financing constraints
should also increase the volatility of prices. Supply constraints increase the
probability of price increases in case of positive demand shocks; unchanged
marginal costs impede price reductions in case of demand reductions.
20
In re-
cession periods with sucient capacities, prices are determined by marginal
costs and the price elasticity of demand. Taken together, nancingl constraints
reduce employment and increase prices; nancing constraints also increase the
volatility of both, employment and prices.
Finally, in the empirical model, it is tested for eects of nancing constraints
on the short-run adjustments of output and the working time. The costs of ad-
justments of the working time stem from a wage premium for overtime working
and a partial compensation of the employees for short-time working; the re-
turns stem from a greater exibility of supply in case of demand changes. In
the model here, the eect of nancing constraints on working-time adjustments
is ambiguous: On the one hand, adjustments of the working time are a rst
instrument for adjusting the labour input; adjustments of employment and the
working time are complementary.
21
On the other hand, if nancing constraints
enforce a downward adjustment of employment, more overtime working should
be necessary; employment adjustment and adjustments of the working time are
substitutes. The eects of nancing constraints on the output adjustment are
clear: Less supply in case of less employment and less demand in case of higher
prices should reduce output. In addition, the same asymmetric eects on up-
ward and downward adjustments hold as for employment, i.e. the volatility of
output should be higher.
19
This eect can be interpreted as disinvestment of rm specic human capital, which is
incorporated in experienced employees.
20
The frequency of price reductions might even increase, if the rm increases the price above
p(w) during a temporary demand increase. A similar eect might arise in case of capacity
constraints.
21
For instance, the rm might employ a strategy of employment adjustments for less qualied
workers and working-time adjustments for qualied employees.
10
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data and empirical specication
The data source for the empirical investigation of the employment adjustment
is a unique panel of micro data from West German manufacturing rms. The
data stem from the business survey, the innovation survey, and the investment
survey of the ifo institute, Munich; the data set contains information from 2405
rms for the period 1980-1992.
22
The innovation survey contains detailed information about the innovation
behaviour of the rm.
23
In the questionnaire, it is also asked for impediments
to innovation activities. Among other choices rms can select \missing exter-
nal funds" and \missing internal funds". As the dierentiation between missing
external or internal funds seems dicult,
24
only a dummy variable indicating ei-
ther missing external or internal funds is used for the empirical analysis. Thus,
rms themselves indicate whether they face nancing constraints, i.e. they can-
not pursue protable innovation activities since they are not able to raise neces-
sary funds. It can be avoided to rely on proxies such as cash ow which might be
less suited (see Faroque and Ton-That, 1995). The estimated equations for the
determinants of nancing constraints treat this nancing constraints dummy as
the endogenous variable, and a probit analysis is performed.
25
The rst explanatory variables cover the inuence of rm size which is
specied by dummy variables according to the average number of employees l
of the rm over the sample. Although large rms are over-represented in the
survey, as compared with total manufacturing, the sample consists mainly of
small and medium-size rms. Since portfolio diversication of multi-product
rms reduces risk, a diversication dummy (divers) is included to capture this
eect. Overall uncertainty is measured by the volatility of demand shocks in
the preceding year at the rm level. It is calculated as the relative frequency
of demand changes 
YD
. In the questionnaire, the rms are asked whether the
demand situation for their product is better, unchanged, or worse, as compared
with the preceding month. 
YD
is dened as the sum of the `better' and `worse'
responses, relative to the total number of observations per year.
Business conditions and business expectations at a six month horizon are
also available from the business survey at a monthly frequency. bc
+
and bc
 
denote the share of \good" and \bad" responses, respectively, for the current
year; be
+
and be
 
give the corresponding shares for future business expec-
tations. The reference cases are rms with medium business conditions and
expecting no changes, respectively. be
+
and be
 
are the shares of rms in the
same sector { excluding the rm under analysis { expecting improving or wors-
22
We would like to thank the ifo institute, Munich, for providing the data and Thomas
Schneeweis for his help with the construction of the data set.
23
Innovations are dened as novelties or essential improvements of the product or the pro-
duction technique.
24
See Winker (1999a) for a discussion.
25
We also estimated a linear probability model with xed eects by OLS.
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ening business conditions, respectively. Thereby, it is assumed that banks are
more likely to detect a general trend than the specic development of a single
rm. A direct measure of demand expectations is contained annually (in De-
cember) in the business survey: The rms report the expected development of
their product market in the medium-run (about 5 years). For the estimates, 2
dummy variables are calculated for a growing market Z
+
and for a shrinking
market Z
 
; a stagnating market is the reference case.
The degree of capacity utilization U of the preceding year is added as control
variable. For U quantitative data are available. This reects cash ow eects on
internal nance not adequately captured by the business conditions dummies.
Finally, a complete set of 11 time dummies is always included in the estimates.
These dummies shall capture e.g. the development of factor costs, since rm-
level data on input costs are not available from the business survey. In order
to control for sector- and rm-specic eects, a specication including sectoral
dummies and a linear probability xed eects model are estimated also.
Data for employment are available from the business survey and the invest-
ment survey. In the business survey, the rms were asked quarterly whether
the number of employees for a specic product will increase l
+
, decrease l
 
, or
remain constant l
=
within the next 3 months (seasonally adjusted). The rms
were also asked whether they exhibit overtime working h
o
, more than custom-
ary overtime working h

, short-time working h
s
, or plan short-time working in
the next 3 months h
s
3
.
26
A prior inspection of the data reveals that adjustments
of the working time are highly correlated with employment changes: Firms that
exhibit (more than customary) overtime working more often report employment
increases, and rms that exhibit (plan) short-time working more often report
employment reductions.
A corresponding quantitative information about employment changes is
available annually for about 60 percent of the rms. The cross-sectional vari-
ance of employment changes is enormous: The standard deviation of the rate of
change of employment for each year is about 10 percent. The data reveal that
rms which more often report employment increases (reductions) during the
year exhibit more (less) employment growth, i.e. the qualitative data appear
to be consistent. Each reported qualitative employment change corresponds to
an about 3 percent change of the rate of change of employment, on average.
In the empirical equations, the annual employment adjustment is explained.
For the quantitative data, an OLS model for the rate of change of employment
is specied. For the qualitative data, ordered probit models for the annual
number of increases, decreases, net increases,
27
and changes are specied. Cor-
responding models are specied for price changes. This should give an infor-
mation about the determinants of the price adjustment as compared with the
employment adjustment. The data on price changes are available monthly. Fi-
nally, ordered probit models for adjustments of output and the working time
26
In Germany, short-time working (temporary lay-os) are subsidized by the Federal Labour
Oce.
27
Net increases are dened as number of increases minus number of decreases during the year.
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are estimated.
In the empirical model, the sequential decision structure of the theoretical
model is exploited for the econometric specication. In the theoretical model, -
nancing constraints, capacities, and innovation behaviour are determined in the
long run; therefore, they can be treated as predetermined for the medium-run
employment and price decision. In addition, the specication of the adjustment
model is based on the assumption that rm-specic demand shocks are auto-
correlated. The rms exploit this autocorrelation when forming expectations
about the development of demand. The model can be understood as an error
correction model for the employment adjustment. These assumptions permit
to interpret lagged values of nancing constraints, innovations, and capacity
utilization as predetermined for the employment adjustment, and the identi-
cation of the model can be sought through lagged values of the explanatory
variables. For the estimates, the data are pooled and an unbalanced panel is
employed. Note that the endogenous variables are already specied as changes.
The rst explanatory variable is the degree of capacity utilization U , which
should reect the relevance of capacity constraints for the employment and price
adjustment. 
YD
serves as a measure of the uncertainty about demand. The
dummy variables Z
+
and Z
 
capture the eect of expected demand changes.
The most important explanatory variable is the indicator dummy for -
nancing constraints, taken from the preceding year: Financing constraints in
December aect the employment adjustment in the following year.
28
In ad-
dition, it is tested for an eect of innovations on the price and employment
adjustment by introducing a dummy variable which is dened for innovators in
the preceding year. Consequently, only the direct eect of nancing constraints
is captured by the coecient for the nancing constraints dummy, not the ef-
fect through innovations.
29
Finally, rm size and diversication dummies are
included as well as time dummies to control for the development of factor costs.
3.2 Estimation results
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for the determinants of nancing
constraints. The dependent variable is the nancing constraints dummy, which
is one for rms facing nancing constraints. The rst two columns of estimated
coecients refer to a probit analysis, while the last column gives the results for
a xed eects linear probability model.
The rst group of explanatory variables covers public and in the short run
xed rms' characteristics which are used by investors for a priori discriminat-
ing. As expected from the theoretical analysis and conrming empirical results
from the literature, rm size exhibits a negative impact. Small rms (l  100)
28
Note that this timing is consistent with the timing used for explaining nancing constraints:
Business conditions and expectations of the current year aect the nancing situation in
December.
29
Eects of nancing constraints on innovations are estimated by Winker (1999a). The results
show that innovation expenditures are signicantly reduced by almost 30 percent if rms
face nancing constraints.
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Table 3: Determinants of nancing constraints
endogenous variable
nancing constraints dummy
Probit analysis xed eects OLS
l  100 0.452
(11.0)
0.463
(10.6)
{
l  1000 -0.265
(-3.6)
-0.315
(-3.8)
{
divers -0.316
(-7.0)
-0.294
(-6.3)
{

YD
0.220
( 2.8)
0.201
(2.5)
0.006
(0.31)
bc
+
-0.514
(-6.9)
-0.493
(-6.3)
-0.068
(-3.9)
bc
 
0.360
(5.0)
0.335
(4.6)
0.043
(2.3)
U -0.123
( -0.7)
-0.032
(-0.2)
-0.040
(-0.7)
be
+
-2.629
(-4.9)
-1.223
(-1.9)
-0.232
(-1.86)
be
 
-0.914
(-2.5)
-0.852
(-1.9)
-0.235
(-2.55)
be
+
0.219
(2.4)
0.274
(2.9)
0.032
(1.33)
be
 
-0.064
(-0.7)
-0.035
(-0.4)
-0.009
(-0.4)
Z
+
0.109
( 2.5)
0.106
(2.3)
0.022
(2.1)
Z
 
0.141
( 2.3)
0.159
( 2.5)
0.033
(2.2)
sectoral dummies no yes {

2
464 (23) 555 (46)
obs 5791 5791 5802
t-statistic in parentheses. Time dummies were included (not reported).
14
face a signicantly higher risk of nancing constraints, rms with more than
1000 employees (l  1000) are less likely to be impeded by missing funds as
compared with the reference category of medium sized rms. The risk reducing
eect of diversication (divers) is also found to signicantly facilitate the access
to funds.
The following four variables summarize the rm's business conditions. Vari-
ability of demand for the rm's products in the preceding year (
YD
) is posi-
tively related to uncertainty about future business conditions and, consequently,
signicantly increases the risk of facing nancing constraints. Since it does not
change much over time it becomes insignicant in the xed eects model. Good
current business conditions (bc
+
) reduce the risk of facing nancing constraints
which can be explained through increased internal cash ow and a positive sig-
nal to external lenders. The expected negative eect of bad current businesses
(bc
 
) is also conrmed by the estimates. No additional signicant eect of the
degree of capacity utilization in the past year (U) is found.
Expectations on future business conditions are mirrored by the variables in
the third and forth group. The rst two variables represent expectations at
the sectoral level. This information is also available to banks. Consequently,
positive business expectations at the sectoral level (be
+
) reduce the risk of facing
nancing constraints. This eect becomes smaller and less signicant if sector
specic eects are already controlled for by including sectoral dummies. The
negative sign for be
 
is somehow puzzling, as the theoretical analysis indicated
a reduced supply of external funds in this case. This negative eect might be
overcompensated by a decline in activity and, thus, loan demand at the sectoral
level.
Private information on rms' expectations is comprised in the last four vari-
ables. Since rm cannot transfer credible information on their future prospects
to outside lenders, these variables capture eects of asymmetric information,
which is a special feature of the ifo rm panel. First, an expected improve-
ment of the business situation (be
+
) intensies nancing constraints. This con-
rms the importance of asymmetric information as derived from the theoretical
model. An expected worsening of the business situation (be
 
) may have two
eects on the demand for funds working in opposite direction. Either the rm
reduces its activity and, consequently, its nancing requirements or it needs ad-
ditional funds to compensate for reduced cash ow. Therefore, the insignicant
estimate for be
 
is consistent with the theoretical reasoning. The medium-run
expectations about market development (Z
+
,Z
 
) exhibit both a signicant pos-
itive impact, i.e. if markets are expected to grow or to shrink uncertainty for
the performance of a single rm in this market increases. Consequently, these
variables can be interpreted as an additional measure of riskiness.
Estimation results do not dier much between the two Probit analyses with-
out and with sectoral dummies except for the inuence of sectoral business
expectations be
+
and be
 
, respectively. Obviously, these variables cover some
sector-specic eects in the rst version. Although the absolute magnitude of
the estimated coecients for the xed eects linear probability model in the
15
last column cannot be compared with the rst two columns, the sign of the
eects remains unchanged and most eects are still signicant.
To sum up the ndings for the sources of nancing constraints, the es-
timation results are consistent with the eects expected from the theoretical
analysis. Uncertainty and asymmetric information tend to increase the proba-
bility of nancing constraints, while rm size, diversication and sectoral trends
tend to reduce it.
In table 4, the estimation results for employment are reported. The en-
dogenous variables are the frequency of employment increases l
+
, employment
reductions l
 
, net employment increases l,
30
employment changes 
l
and the
rate of change of employment  lnL. For the qualitative data (l
+
; l
 
;l; 
l
),
ordered probit models are specied; for the quantitative data ( lnL), an OLS
model is estimated. Corresponding models for the qualitative data on the price
adjustment are reported in table 5. The explanatory variables refer to the pre-
ceding year.
The estimation results rstly reveal that capacity utilization U and the de-
mand conditions 
YD
; Z exhibit well determined and reasonable eects on the
employment and price adjustment. A high capacity utilization in the preced-
ing year increases the frequency of (net) employment increases and reduces the
frequency of employment reductions and employment changes. A consistent
result is revealed for the rate of change of employment. A high capacity utiliza-
tion also increases the frequency of (net) price increases. Note that even the
frequency of price reductions is higher for those rms which work with a high
capacity utilization, i.e. those rms more often change prices. These estimates
conrm the results of the theoretical model, i.e. capacity constraints increase
the volatility of prices and reduce the volatility of employment.
A large volatility of demand shocks 
YD
increases the volatility of both,
prices and employment. In addition, demand uncertainty tends to increase
prices and reduce employment. A consistent result is also revealed for demand
expectations Z
+
; Z
 
. Firms expecting an increasing (shrinking) demand in-
crease (reduce) prices and employment; rms expecting a stagnating market
(the reference category) less often change employment and prices. These re-
sults conrm the assumptions applied in the theoretical model of employment
and price adjustment.
Below, the eects of innovations and nancing constraints on the employ-
ment and price adjustment are reported. First, innovative rms are more suc-
cessful. They more often increase employment and are less often forced to
reduce prices. In addition, they less often change prices and more often change
employment. This hints towards an eect of innovations on the market struc-
ture, i.e. innovations protect the rms from competition.
The estimation results for nancing constraints also conrm the implications
of the theoretical model. First, rms with nancial distress less often increase
employment and more often reduce employment; the net eect on employment
30
Net employment increases are dened as l = l
+
  l
 
.
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Table 4: Employment adjustment
endogenous variables
l
+
l
 
l 
l
lnL
U 1.125
( 6.4)
-1.292
(-9.0)
1.269
(10.2)
-0.469
(-3.6)
0.102
( 7.3)

YD
0.423
( 5.8)
0.478
( 7.2)
-0.107
(-2.0)
0.598
(10.4)
0.005
( 0.8)
Z
+
0.428
( 9.8)
-0.269
(-7.1)
0.353
(11.0)
0.060
( 1.8)
0.018
( 4.9)
Z
 
-0.213
(-2.7)
0.278
( 5.4)
-0.263
(-5.5)
0.203
( 4.2)
-0.008
(-1.4)
innovation 0.169
( 2.3)
-0.010
(-0.2)
0.062
( 1.2)
0.084
( 1.6)
0.013
( 2.4)
nancing -0.053
(-1.1)
0.210
( 5.3)
-0.157
(-4.7)
0.135
( 3.7)
-0.009
(-2.3)
constraints
l  100 0.053
( 1.2)
-0.233
(-5.9)
0.158
( 4.7)
-0.155
(-4.5)
-0.001
(-0.3)
l  1000 -0.044
(-0.7)
0.316
( 5.9)
-0.212
(-5.0)
0.215
( 4.5)
-0.018
(-3.7)
divers -0.196
(-4.5)
-0.140
(-3.6)
0.002
( 0.1)
-0.199
(-5.9)

2
20
671 1007 1270 407 0.086

obs 6146 6146 6146 6146 3605
t-statistics in parentheses. Time dummies were included (not reported).

R
2
is reported.
is clearly negative. The quantitative impact is quite large: Firms with nancing
constraints exhibit an about 1 percentage points lower rate of change of em-
ployment, on average. Since nancing constraints also aect innovations and
investment, an additional negative eect on employment can be expected. Note
also that the eect of nancing constraints on employment reductions is larger,
as compared with the eect on employment increases; consequently nancing
constraints also increase the volatility of employment.
As expected, the eect of nancing constraints on prices is less pronounced,
as compared with the employment eects. The coecients are hardly signif-
icant. Nevertheless, the sign of the eects is consistent with the theoretical
model. Constrained rms more often increase (change) prices, i.e. the quantity
adjustment is inhibited and prices rise instead; the eect on net price increases
is also positive albeit statistically not signicant.
The results for the rm-size dummies reveal that large rms exhibit less
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Table 5: Price adjustment
endogenous variable
p
+
p
 
p 
p
U 0.551
( 4.6)
0.475
( 2.9)
0.252
( 2.2)
0.644
( 5.5)

YD
0.334
( 5.9)
0.477
( 6.2)
0.085
( 1.5)
0.537
(10.0)
Z
+
0.134
( 4.2)
-0.137
(-3.3)
0.153
( 5.1)
0.068
( 2.2)
Z
 
-0.116
(-2.5)
0.168
( 2.9)
-0.140
(-3.2)
0.030
( 0.7)
innovation 0.012
( 0.3)
-0.196
(-3.1)
0.064
( 1.5)
-0.096
(-2.2)
nancing 0.043
( 1.3)
0.047
( 1.0)
0.025
( 0.8)
0.056
( 1.7)
constraints
l  100 0.035
( 1.1)
0.152
( 3.5)
-0.019
(-0.6)
0.115
( 3.7)
l  1000 -0.056
(-1.1)
-0.010
(-0.2)
-0.058
(-1.2)
-0.078
(-1.7)
divers -0.023
(-0.7)
-0.052
(-1.2)
0.001
( 0.1)
-0.053
(-1.7)

2
20
279 258 305 232
obs 6153 6153 6153 6153
t-statistics in parentheses. Time dummies were included (not reported).
employment growth, as compared with small- and medium-size rms. Firm
size also exhibits a positive eect on the volatility of employment. This is
consistent with the higher frequency of price adjustments in small rms. Note
also that diversied rms exhibit a lower volatility of employment.
31
Finally, in table 6, the eects of nancing constraints on the short-run ad-
justment of output and the working time are reported.
32
The estimates for
output mirror those for employment: Firms with nancial distress more often
reduce output y
 
. The eect on output increases y
+
is not signicant; therefore,
the eect on net output increases y is negative and the volatility of output

y
is higher. Financing constraints also reduce the working time. Constrained
31
The robustness of the results was tested by inclusion of sector dummies (see tables A3 and
A4 in the appendix). The results show that the coecients are hardly aected.
32
The complete estimation results of the equations are contained in table A5 and A6 in the
appendix. Output changes are dened corresponding to employment and price changes, the
equations are estimated by ordered probit models.
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Table 6: Adjustment of output and the working time
Output adjustment
endogenous variables
y
+
y
 
y 
y
nancing -0.014
(-0.4)
0.110
( 3.2)
-0.090
(-2.9)
0.074
( 2.2)
constraints

2
20
767 1318 1008 1165
obs 6153 6153 6153 6153
Adjustment of the working time
endogenous variable
h
o
h

h
s
h
s
3
nancing -0.072
(-1.9)
0.006
( 0.1)
0.151
( 3.2)
0.211
( 4.8)
constraints

2
20
1175 515 849 1216
obs 6135 6153 6077 6071
t-statistics in parentheses. Time dummies were included (not reported).
The complete estimation results are reported in table A3 in the appendix.
rms less often exhibit overtime working h
o
, and more often exhibit h
s
or plan
h
s
3
short-time working.
33
Than means, adjustments of employment and the
working time are complementary.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, a theoretical model of the causes and the short-run eects of
nancing constraints is developed. In the model, asymmetric information and
adverse incentives lead to a rationing of the credit demand of the rms or to a
gap between the costs of internal and external nance. Insucient funds pre-
vent rms from implementing otherwise protable investment and innovation
projects in the long run; higher nancing costs and medium-run liquidity con-
straints aect employment and prices. The employment and price adjustment
is analysed within a framework of monopolistic competition on the product
market, uncertainty about the location of the demand curve and medium-run
capacity and nancing constraints.
The central contribution of the paper is the estimation of the employment
33
The eect on more than usual overtime working h

is not signicant.
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consequences of nancing constraints. The determinants of the employment
and price adjustment are estimated with a unique panel of rm-level data from
West German manufacturing. The data-set contains a direct measure of nanc-
ing constraints at the rm level which circumvents the often arguable use of
indicators for the assessment of the liquidity situation of the rms.
The empirical results clearly indicate that nancing constraints matter.
Liquidity-constrained rms are more often forced to reduce employment, the
employment smoothing during temporary demand disturbances is restrained,
and the volatility of both, employment and prices, is higher. Since nanc-
ing constraints also aect investment and the implementation of innovations,
additional eects on employment can be expected.
The empirical results also conrm that nancing constraints are determined
by factors related to internal cash ow (past success) and asymmetric informa-
tion. In particular, the impact of asymmetric information is detected not only
indirectly through rm size and related variables, but also directly through
explicit information about future business prospects.
The ndings allow for the conclusion that increasing uncertainty on nancial
markets or about goods demand reduces employment and increases employment
volatility at the rm level. Although it is not possible to derive aggregate, i.e.
general equilibrium conclusions from these rm level eects, at least some dis-
tributive eects persist: Small, fast growing, innovative rms are most heavily
concerned. Consequently, nancing constraints may reduce the rate of technical
progress and structural change.
Besides attempts to introduce the analysis in a general equilibrium con-
text, straightforward extensions of the present approach comprise models with
endogenous decisions on inventories, investment and innovation given the possi-
bility of nancing constraints. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare
the results for prot maximizing rms with the case when rms maximize their
survival probability as a result of a principal{agent framework.
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Appendix
Table A1: Variable list, endogenous variables
range mean
Business Survey
l
+
planned employment increases 0,: : : ,4 0.27
l
 
planned employment reductions 0,: : : ,4 0.54

l
employment changes 0,: : : ,4 0.81
l net employment increases -4,: : : ,4 -0.28
within the next 3 month
p
+
realized price increases 0,: : : ,12 1.32
p
 
realized price reductions 0,: : : ,12 0.58

p
price changes 0,: : : ,12 1.90
p net price increases -12,: : : ,12 0.74
as compared with the preceding month
y
+
realized output increases 0,: : : ,12 1.66
y
 
realized output reductions 0,: : : ,12 2.09

y
output changes 0,: : : ,12 3.75
y net output increases -12,: : : ,12 -0.43
as compared with the preceding month
h
o
overtime working 0,: : : ,4 1.38
h
o
more than customary overtime working 0,: : : ,4 0.29
h
s
short time working 0,: : : ,4 0.30
h
s
3
short time working in the next 3 months 0,: : : ,4 0.47
Investment Survey
lnL rate of change of employment quant. -0.01
Innovation Survey
fc nancing constraints for innovations dummy 0.23
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Table A2: Variable list, explanatory variables
range mean
Business Survey
bc
+
: good business conditions 0,: : : ,1 0.21
bc
 
: bad business conditions 0,: : : ,1 0.22
be
+
: expected improvement of business conditions 0,: : : ,1 0.13
be
 
: expected worsening of business conditions 0,: : : ,1 0.21
within the next 6 month
be
+
: sector mean of be
+
0,: : : ,1 0.13
be
 
: sector mean of be
 
0,: : : ,1 0.21
calculated excluding the respective rm
U : capacity utilization rate 0.3,: : : ,1 0.83

YD
: demand changes 0,: : : ,1 0.40
Z
+
: growing market expected dummy 0.43
Z
 
: shrinking market expected dummy 0.13
within the next 5 years
L  100: rm size dummy 0.41
L  1000: rm size dummy 0.09
divers: diversication, product level employment
less than rm level employment dummy 0.33
Innovation Survey
inno: innovation activity dummy 0.64
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Figure A1: Employment, capacity utilization and demand
Source: Ifo rm panel, 2405 rms, 1980-1992.
l
+
l
 

l
l
U

YD
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Table A3: Employment adjustment
l
+
l
 
l 
l
lnL
U 1.291
( 7.0)
-1.323
(-9.0)
1.364
(10.7)
-0.401
(-3.0)
0.110
( 7.7)

YD
0.414
( 5.4)
0.480
( 7.1)
-0.116
(-2.1)
0.599
(10.2)
0.005
( 0.9)
Z
+
0.402
( 8.8)
-0.273
(-7.0)
0.342
(10.4)
0.038
( 1.1)
0.015
( 4.2)
Z
 
-0.215
(-2.7)
0.289
( 5.5)
-0.270
(-5.6)
0.214
( 4.3)
-0.007
(-1.2)
innovation 0.148
( 1.9)
-0.045
(-0.8)
0.072
( 1.3)
0.038
( 0.7)
0.013
( 2.3)
nancing -0.069
(-1.3)
0.192
( 4.8)
-0.149
(-4.3)
0.118
( 3.2)
-0.008
(-2.0)
constraints
l  100 0.031
( 0.7)
-0.178
(-4.3)
0.118
( 3.4)
-0.113
(-3.1)
-0.004
(-1.0)
l  1000 -0.043
(-0.7)
0.235
( 4.1)
-0.157
(-3.5)
0.151
( 2.9)
-0.014
(-2.6)
divers -0.188
(-4.0)
-0.188
(-4.7)
0.033
( 1.0)
-0.233
(-6.7)

2
46
770 1111 1347 536 0.088
obs 6146 6146 6146 6146 3605
t-statistic in parentheses.
Time and sector dummies were included (not reported).

R
2
is reported.
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Table A4: Price adjustment
p
+
p
 
p 
p
U 0.588
( 4.8)
0.328
( 1.9)
0.319
( 2.7)
0.621
( 5.2)

YD
0.328
( 5.7)
0.573
( 6.8)
0.050
( 0.9)
0.567
(10.3)
Z
+
0.144
( 4.4)
-0.099
(-2.2)
0.141
( 4.6)
0.102
( 3.2)
Z
 
-0.121
(-2.5)
0.230
( 3.8)
-0.157
(-3.5)
0.050
( 1.1)
innovation 0.049
( 1.0)
-0.038
(-0.6)
0.033
( 0.8)
0.018
( 0.4)
nancing 0.032
( 0.9)
0.084
( 1.8)
0.007
( 0.2)
0.061
( 1.8)
constraints
l  100 0.008
( 0.3)
0.019
( 0.4)
0.008
( 0.2)
0.024
( 0.7)
l  1000 -0.057
(-1.1)
0.077
( 1.0)
-0.085
(-1.6)
-0.029
(-0.6)
divers -0.032
(-1.0)
-0.062
(-1.3)
0.002
( 0.1)
-0.065
(-2.0)

2
46
474 849 480 729
obs 6153 6153 6153 6153
t-statistic in parentheses.
Time and sector dummies were included (not reported).
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Table A5: Output adjustment
y
+
y
 
y 
y
U -0.371
(-3.0)
-1.053
(-8.8)
0.521
( 4.6)
-0.947
(-8.4)

YD
1.152
(21.5)
1.140
(21.5)
0.041
( 0.8)
1.570
(32.2)
Z
+
0.243
( 7.8)
-0.146
(-4.7)
0.251
( 8.4)
0.066
( 2.2)
Z
 
-0.177
(-3.6)
0.282
( 6.3)
-0.342
(-8.0)
0.117
( 2.6)
innovation 0.246
( 4.8)
-0.048
(-1.0)
0.218
( 4.8)
0.119
( 2.4)
nancing -0.014
(-0.4)
0.110
( 3.2)
-0.090
(-2.9)
0.074
( 2.2)
constraints
l  100 0.057
( 1.8)
0.069
( 2.2)
-0.003
(-0.1)
0.079
( 2.6)
l  1000 -0.211
(-4.5)
-0.207
(-4.5)
-0.010
(-0.2)
-0.269
(-6.4)
divers -0.068
(-2.2)
-0.083
(-2.7)
0.015
( 0.5)
-0.081
(-2.8)

2
20
767 1318 1008 1165
obs 6153 6153 6153 6153
t-statistic in parentheses. Time dummies were included (not reported).
28
Table A6: Adjustment of the working time
h
o
h

h
s
h
s
3
U 2.069
(15.7)
1.715
( 9.5)
-2.012
(-12.4)
-1.964
(-13.2)

YD
-0.103
(-1.9)
0.303
( 4.1)
0.375
( 4.8)
0.573
( 7.9)
Z
+
0.222
( 6.9)
0.159
( 3.7)
-0.155
( -3.4)
-0.162
( -3.9)
Z
 
-0.175
(-3.3)
-0.190
(-2.6)
0.134
( 2.2)
0.322
( 5.9)
innovation 0.237
( 4.2)
0.181
( 2.5)
-0.095
( -1.4)
-0.101
( -1.6)
nancing -0.072
(-1.9)
0.006
( 0.1)
0.151
( 3.2)
0.211
( 4.8)
constraints
l  100 -0.211
(-6.3)
-0.027
(-0.6)
-0.273
( -5.7)
-0.198
( -4.6)
l  1000 0.089
( 1.9)
-0.198
(-3.1)
0.227
( 3.5)
0.164
( 2.6)
divers -0.268
(-8.2)
-0.295
(-6.6)
-0.067
( -1.4)
-0.101
( -2.4)

2
20
1175 515 849 1216
obs 6135 6153 6077 6071
t-statistic in parentheses. Time dummies were included (not reported).
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